摘要
国企经营者的经济学身份与效用函数是进行相关制度设计的关键。文章通过考据与论证,明确指出由于现行体制的束缚,中国的国有企业缺乏真正意义上的企业家,国企的经营者不过是一个有中国特色的官僚与代理人的混合体,并在官僚效用函数模型的基础上进行机制设计,同时运用逆向归纳法求解市场博弈中的合理均衡。
The economic identity and the utility function of the stateowned enterprise operators are the key of the institutional arrangement. By the serious research, this paper argues that the stateowned enterprises were short of real enterpreneurs, and the operators were merely the combination of bureaucracies and agents. Based on the bureaucracy utility function model, the paper makes mechanism arrangement and tries to find the rational market equilibrium in market game by employing the backward induction.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第9期113-123,共11页
Journal of Finance and Economics
关键词
国有企业
经营者
官僚
制度设计
stateowned enterprise
operator
bureaucracy
institution arrangement