股权分裂、激励问题与股利政策——中国股利之谜及其成因分析

The Split of Stock Ownership, the Problem of Encouragement, and the Policy of Dividend on Shares

通过中国上市公司10年股利政策实践的分析,我们认为无论是与经典股利理论还是西方国家相比,这一财务行为存在很多令人费解的现象,或者说是一个“中国股利之谜”。通过一个简化融资模型,我们阐明了这一“股利之谜”形成的制度根源在于中国特殊的股权结构,即股权分裂。股权分裂的存在,加上非流通股的控股地位以及低廉的投资成本,使得中国上市公司财务决策中的激励问题(尤其是非流通股股东及其代理人与流通股股东之间的利益冲突)处于一种激化状态。在外部约束失效的当前中国经济中,由于这些控股股东及其代理人作为“内部人”基本可以为所欲为,以各种“合法”的财务行为侵害流通股股东权益,进而导致财务决策机制扭曲,股利分配行为的异化也就在意料之中了。

After an analysis of China's listed companies' ten years-practice of policies for dividend on shares, we think that, whether compared with the theory of classical theory of dividend on shares or with the practice of Western countries, China's financial behavior in this respect has a lot of puzzles, or you can call them 'Riddles of China's Dividend on Shares'. By a simplified financing model, we have expounded the fact that the system root of producing these 'riddles' is China's peculiar structure of share ownership, i.e. the separation of stock ownership. This, together with the holding position of non-floating stock and low investment cost, makes acute the problem (especially of interest clashes between non-floating stock owners and their agents on the one hand and floating stock owners on the other) of encouragement in financial decision making in China's listed companies. In the present China's economy where external binding loses efficiency, because these stock-holding owners and their agents as 'insiders' can almost do as they please and can, under the cloak of various' legal' financial behavior, spoil the interest of owners of floating shares, thus resulting in distortion in financial decision-making mechanism, not surprising at all is the alienation of the behavior of distribution of dividend on shares.