董事激励与公司业绩——实验的证据

Directors'Incentives and Corporate Performance

我们在实验框架下检验了董事会成员的激励对股东财富和CEO报酬的影响,以及该报酬与公司业绩之间的敏感度.文中提出了两种任命董事的方法,一种由CEO任命,另一种由最大的股东自动担任董事.由董事会决定CEO的报酬,而CEO负责企业的生产、投资和分红决策.投资者根据接收到的每个公司的分红、资本收益这些信息,通过买卖这些企业的股票来调整他们的资产组合. 我们发现,薪酬与业绩之间的敏感度随董事持股比例的增加而上升.此外,当大股东作为董事会成员时,经济体所产生的财富(股东财富是其中的一部分)更大;而当CEO选择董事时,结果是缺乏效率的.本文讨论了关于董事职能和相关代理成本这一研究结果,以及标准会计框架下,限制执行人员报酬和报表标准化要求.

We examine the effect of the incentives of the members of the board of directors on shareholder wealth, CEO compensation and the sensitivity of this compensation to corporate performance in laboratory setting. Two methods of appointing the board, one by the CEO and the other by the largest shareholder, constitute the main treatment. The board sets the compensation for the CEO, who makes production, investment and dividend decisions for the firm. The investors receive information about dividends, earnings and capital of each firm, and use this information to manage their portfolios by buying and selling shares in these firms.We find that the sensitivity of the pay-performance link increases with the fraction of equity owned by the directors. Further, the wealth generated in the economy as a whole, as well as the shareholders' part of this wealth, is greater when a large shareholder serves the role of the board of directors; when CEOs choose the director, outcomes are less efficient. Implications of these findings on the role of directors and associated agency costs; on accounting standard setting, especially with regard to accounting for options; on limits to executive compensation; and on standardization of reporting requirements are discussed.