发电市场不同竞争模式下发电商的策略性远期合同交易

Strategic Forward Contracting under Different Competition Modes in Power Generation Markets

发电商的远期合同交易会影响发电现货市场的竞争,这种策略影响关系可能会激励发电商参与远期合同交易(策略性远期合同交易).针对不同的发电现货市场竞争模式,研究了多个非对称发电商的策略性远期合同交易问题.通过均衡分析,表明如果每个发电商进行其合同决策时认为其他所有发电商的合同交易量给定不变,则在发电现货市场Cournot竞争模式下,每个理性发电商都会进行一定数量的策略性合同交易;而当发电现货市场采用线性供应函数竞争时,发电商将失去策略性合同交易的激励.算例分析证实了理论结果.

Power generators' forward contract sales have strategic impacts on the competition in power generation spot markets. It is possible that these strategic impacts also give rise to another incentive for generators to sign forward contracts. Strategic forward contracting induced by this incentive is exa-(mined) under different competition types in a generation spot market with asymmetric and multiple strategic generators. It is revealed from an equilibrium analysis that, if a rational generator assumes fixed positions of the other generators in making its own forward contracting decision, he will voluntarily take part in the strategic contracting under Cournot competition in the generation spot market, while under linear supply function competition in generation spot markets, the incentive to strategic contracting will be lost for each generator. A numerical example is used to verify the theoretical (results.)