摘要
在统一价格竞价机制下,考虑到电力需求弹性,建立了完全信息静态博弈模型,求解得到了发电商的最优报价策略.通过分析,指出了发电商报价行为的特点以及统一价格竞争机制所存的缺陷,证明了该机制不是成功的竞价机制.
Based on the demand elasticity of electricity, this paper presents a game model with complete information under the uniform price auction rule and acquires the optimal bidding strategy of the generating entities. The characteristic of the bidding strategy and the defect of this rule are pointed out. It is proved that the uniform price auction rule is not good.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2004年第4期83-87,共5页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
辽宁省科技厅项目(2002401017)
关键词
电力市场
报价
博弈
统一价格竞价机制
electricity market
bidding
game
uniform price auction rule
