摘要
运用博弈论中的一级密封价格拍卖原理,构建了发电商在竞价上网中按市场边际出清价结算和按机组实际申报价格结算两种不同结算方式下的最优策略博弈模型,从而得到不同的最优报价策略,随后比较了在两种不同报价策略下市场交易的社会总剩余(福利)的变化。分析结果表明在按机组实际报价的结算方式下会导致社会福利的净损失。
Different strategies of generation companies under different settlements are introduced. Based on the principle of firstprice sealed auction, the optimal game models of bidding strategy in deregulated generation power market under two different conditions, the settlement method of market clearing price (MCP) and the settlement method of payasbid are presented respectively. The variation of social surplus (welfare) is compared under the two different conditions of bidding strategies. It is indicated that the settlement method of payasbid adopted will result in the dead weight loss of society welfare.
出处
《电力科学与工程》
2004年第2期28-30,62,共4页
Electric Power Science and Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(No 70071036)
关键词
电力市场
结算方法
竞价策略
社会总剩余
electricity power market
settlement method
bidding strategy
social surplus.