国有企业治理结构中科层的控制权配置特征及效率分析

Analyses of the Character and Efficiency of the Governance Structure in State-owned Corporations' Hierarchy

由于国有资产所有者缺位的现实,造成了计量和监督国有资产经营者对企业贡献的固有困难,从而不得不采取事后激励的“控制权回报”或“国家租金”的激励制度,这种激励制度使国有企业科层内控制权的配置具有了自身的逻辑。这种科层内控制权配置的目标趋向不是使企业剩余最大化,而是对既定剩余份额的争夺。这种争夺导致的国有企业科层内控制权配置的调整是国有企业治理结构形成的主要变动因素。由于资产属性的多样性,使国有科层内控制权的配置具有多样性,并且处于不断的调整过程中。由于控制权配置的调整偏离了企业剩余最大化的原则,这种控制权配置过程和均衡状态,都会造成国有企业效率的损失。

Owning to the difficulty in measurement and supervision for the state owner absence- public-owned corporations adopt staterent bestirring. As an after bestirring staterent bestirring makes the control structure in state-owned corporations depart from rule of corporation residual maximum. The control structure in state corporations under staterent bestirring will result in the losing of state corporations' efficiency.