摘要
在分工程度较高、产品互补性较强的产业中,企业的新技术采用决策受技术的网络外部性和不完全信息的影响。用传统的博弈论模型解释这种条件下企业的决策行为,只能得到对应现实中两种极端情况的两重纳什均衡。本文将一个包含噪声的不完全信息博弈模型引用到这个问题中,得到了更符合现实中常见情况的唯一贝叶斯纳什均衡,并分析了产业链长度、分工程度、企业对新技术市场前景的预期、技术的网络外部性和市场环境的不确定性等参数对均衡解的影响。
To the industrial enterprises with high degree of both division of labor and complementarities in products, the decision on new technology adoption are influenced by network externalities of technology and incomplete information. The traditional game theory model gave two Nash equilibriums to explain the decision of enterprises in this condition. Two equilibriums conform two extreme real decision results merely. Using an incomplete information game theory model with a small white noise, an unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium was obtained, which match the common real decision results better. The parameters influencing the equilibrium was analyzed also, such as the length of production chain, the level of division of labor, the expected market value of new technology, the degree of network externalities and uncertainty of market.
出处
《工业工程与管理》
2004年第4期107-111,共5页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(01JD630001)
