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国有企业外部人控制:一个寻租视角 被引量:2

Outsiders Control of SOE: A Study of Rent Seeking
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摘要 国有企业的公共物品性导致国有企业蜕变为一个多重寻租网络。政府作为国有企业的外部控制人,借助政企不分、个人权力的无约束和责任体系弱化、多层委托与多重代理等体制性弊病的掩饰,与国有企业代理人合谋寻租,国有企业的"内部人控制"应运而生。可以说,国有企业若不存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"几乎不可能产生;国有企业若存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"便几乎一定会产生。"外部人控制"产生的必要前提是国有企业泛化为公共物品,而国有企业泛化为公共物品,必须具备以下条件:包括存在可供寻租的租金、存在制度性的寻租通道、存在租金和信息的传递系统。国有企业外部人控制具有极大的危害,主要表现为降低企业家的生产性努力水平和使得企业家行为寻租化。解决问题的关键在于进行产权改革,使产权得到清晰界定并得到有效保护,同时不会出现事后寻租的现象。 The nature of public goods causes SOEs to become a multiple network of rent-seeking.As the outsider of SOEs, government conspires and seeks renting with the agent of state-owned enterprise in virtue of tightness between government and enterprise, nonrestraint might and weakening responsibility system and multilevel agency.At the same time, the insiders control arieses.We can say if state-owned enterprise have not 'outsiders control', 'insiders control' can not produce almost; if there is 'outsiders control' in state-owned enterprise, it is nearly sure to produce 'insiders control'.The prerequisite of'outsiders control' is that the state-owned enterprise turns into public goods.While SOE's turning into public goods must satisfy following conditions including existing suitable renting, institutional rent-seeking passway and transmission system of rent and message.'Outsiders control' in state-owned enterprise has great dangers inluding reducing production diligent competence and make entrepreneur's behavior inefficiency.The key of solving the problem lies in carrying on property right reform, and makes the property right be protected effectively while rent-seeking afterwards not appearring at the same time.
作者 裴红卫
出处 《财经问题研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2004年第7期59-64,共6页 Research On Financial and Economic Issues
关键词 公共物品 多重寻租网络 外部人控制 内部人控制 产权 public goods multiple network of rent-seeking insiders control outsiders control property right
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共引文献223

同被引文献16

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