摘要
认知T-原则是一种过强的认知原则,一般的认知不具有此性质。"逻辑全能性质"不只是"理想认知主体"才具有的认知性质,一般的"理性认知主体"也具有某些"逻辑全能"的性质。在一种修正的可能世界语义学下,削弱了"逻辑全能问题",并且保留了那些合理的认知性质。认知T-原则在这种语义学下,不会有效。自信性以及弱自信性认知逻辑系统刻画了认知主体的自信性和弱自信性。这两个系统相对于这种语义学有可靠性和完全性。
Epistemic T-principle is too strong, and general cognition does not have the property. Logic Omniscience Properties are not the ones that only ideal epistemic agents can have, however general rational agents have some of them. A revisory Kipke semantics weakens Logic Omniscience Problems and remains those reasonable epistemic properties. Epistemic T-principle is not valid in this semantics. BT and BD capture the epistemic agent's self-belief and weak self-belief respectively. The two systems are both sound and complete in this semantics.
出处
《湖南科技大学学报(社会科学版)》
2004年第5期28-34,共7页
Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)
关键词
逻辑全能
认知逻辑语义
K-系统
典范框架
典范模
logic omniscience
semantics of epistemic logic
K-system
Canonical Frame
Canonical Model