摘要
本文首先回顾总结了计件工资制度的发展过程和存在的问题,指出计件工资博弈陷入低效僵局的原因在于管理者的不履行事先的承诺。传统的解释是管理者事后抵挡不住自利的诱惑,本文认为管理者守诺还是不守诺是在权衡计件工资员工和计时工资员工激励效果后作出的理性的选择。管理者守诺只在一定的情形下发生所以计件工资制不流行。
This thesis first reviews the development of a piece rate system and its deficiency, meanwhile, it points out that the manager's not carrying out commitments accounts for inefficient result of a piece rate game. Although traditional theory attribute the reason to manager's selfishness, this thesis hypothesize that whether carrying out the commitment or not is based on the trade - off between carrying out commitment and equity in a piece rate game. The unpopularity of a piece rate system results from that it's rational for the manager to carry out the commitment in seldom cases.
出处
《上海管理科学》
2004年第4期56-58,共3页
Shanghai Management Science
关键词
计件工资制度
企业经济
公平原则
计时工资
A piece rate system, Managerial Dilemma, Game theory, Equity Theory
