摘要
市场上存在一个上游和一个下游企业时,纵向一体化能使上游企业的R＆D投资、下游企业的产品产量和行业利润均增加。本文研究了在不进行纵向一体化的情况下,上下游企业之间是否能够通过谈判,达成契约,从而使上游企业的R＆D投资、下游企业的产品产量和行业利润都达到纵向一体化时水平的问题。研究表明:如果上、下游企业进行两阶段动态博弈,该契约不会是一个子博弈精炼纳什均衡。只有上、下游企业进行无限次重复博弈,双方才有可能达成契约,并且双方都会遵守该契约。
When an upstream and a downstream firm exist in the market,vertical integration can increase the upstream R&D expenditure,the downstream output,and the industry profit.This paper studies the problem whether the upstream and downstream firms can sign a contract to increase the upstream R&D expenditure,the downstream output,and the industry profit to the level after the vertical integration.It is shown that,if the upstream and downstream firms play two-stage dynamic game,the contract is not a perfect Nash equilibrium.If the upstream and downstream firms play infinitely repeated game,the contract can be signed and abided.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
2004年第4期28-32,共5页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
教育部高校博士点专项基金(20020611009)
