跨国公司对外直接投资博弈均衡分析及启示

Analysis on MNCs′ Game of FDI and the Enlightenment from It

首先分析了博弈中各参与人的最优策略组合 ,得出唯一的纳什均衡为{进入 ,进入 } ,即无论对手的选择如何 ,自己选择进入总是最优的。接下来分析了在对手已经进入目标国市场的情况下 ,跨国公司博弈的占优战略仍是进入 ,所以纳什均衡仍是 {进入 ,进入 }。最后考察的是进入的先后对竞争结果的影响 ,模型说明 ,如果可能 ,各公司均将力争抢先进入目标国市场。取得“先动优势”是各大跨国公司纷纷抢先对外投资的直接原因。

This paper elaborates the game equilibrium of foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations (MNCs). Firstly, it analyses the dominance strategy combination of the players and reaches the sole Nash equilibrium——{entrance, entrance}, that is, whatever the choice of the other player is,entering the foreign market is the best choice for the player. Secondly, it makes an analysis on the condition that the other player has already entered the target market and reaches the conclusion that the dominance strategy of MNCs is still entrance, thus the Nash equilibrium is still {entrance, entrance}. Finally, the impact of the order of play on the outcome of competition is examined and the Model illustrates that if possible, each corporation would try their best to be the first in entering the target market. To gain an “initiative advantage” is the direct reason for the MNCs' rushing to make investment abroad. The experience of FDI by MNCs would surely enlighten Chinese companies in transnational development.