逻辑与怀疑——维特根斯坦《逻辑哲学论》研究

Logic and Scepticism——The Study of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Wittgenstein

“可说的东西”和“不可说的东西”是维特根斯坦《逻辑哲学论》为思想的表达划的界限 ,逻辑与怀疑同构其中。实在论、遵从逻辑语法的语言记号、记号的指谓前提是构造《逻辑哲学论》的脚手架 ,但它们因对哲学与日常生活的非现实性而表达着《逻辑哲学论》的怀疑 ,《逻辑哲学论》所内涵的怀疑及对不可说的东西的承诺决定了后期维特根斯坦《哲学研究》的主题 。

Things can be said'and 'things can not be said'delimit the expression of thought in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, so both the logic and skepticism are expressed in it. The realism, the linguistic sign under the logical grammar and the premise of sign's signify are the scaffolding to construct Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, but they express the scepticism of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus for their unrealism to philosophy and daily life. The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the foundation of whole philosophic system of Wittgenstein because it decides the topical subject of the Philosophical Investigations just for expressing the doubt in itself and affirming the existence of the things unable to say.