多个零售商库存竞争下的易逝品回购合同研究被引量：45

A Study on Buy Back Contract of Perishable Goods under Retail Inventory Competition

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摘要在单个供应商和多个零售商构成的易逝品两级供应链中,市场终端价格固定,各个零售商对称且在同一区域市场销售相同产品,市场需求不确定;库存越多,销量期望值越大,零售商之间存在库存竞争。采用贴近实际的有效需求函数证明供应商采用回购合同时,零售商库存竞争存在惟一的纯策略纳什均衡;同时回购合同可以实现供应链协调,能在供应商和零售商之间任意分配整个供应链期望利润;最后讨论回购合同常见的几个原因。 In a two-echelon supply chain of perishable goods consisted by a supplier and multi-retailers, the market price is exogenous, the retailers are symmetry and they sell the same perishable product, the market demand is stochastic. There (exist) inventory competition among them. When the supplier adopts buy back contract, the retail inventory game exists an (unique) pure-strategic Nash equilibrium. Buy back contract can coordinate the above supply chain and divide the whole (expected) profit between supplier and retailers arbitrarily. At last we discuss some reasons why Buy back contract is popular in practice.

作者赵泉午熊榆林娅熊中楷

机构地区重庆大学经济与工商管理学院英国诺丁汉特伦特大学计算与技术学院重庆通信学院研究生大队

出处《系统工程》 CSCD 北大核心 2004年第8期39-42,共4页 Systems Engineering

基金国家青年社科基金资助项目(02CJY027)

关键词供应链协调纳什均衡易逝品回购合同 Supply Chain Coordination Nash equilibrium Perishable Goods Buy Back Contract

分类号 F713.1 [经济管理—产业经济] F224.32 [经济管理—国民经济]

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