摘要
用博弈论的方法分析纯战略和混合战略两种情况下投标人失信的经济根源 ,分析认为 ,不管在什么情况下 ,只要没有激励和有效的监督约束 ,投标人肯定会弄虚作假甚至舞弊 .
The pure and mixed strategies of breaking his promise of bidder with Game Theory is analyzed. So long as there is no incentive mechanism and efficient monitoring constraint, bidders will be certain to break his promise or fraud under any cases. Finally, this paper suggests some measures against breaking promise of bidders.
出处
《武汉化工学院学报》
2004年第2期93-96,共4页
Journal of Wuhan Institute of Chemical Technology
关键词
招投标
不完全信息
静态博弈
战略均衡
建议措施
tendering
uncompleted information
static game
pure strategies
mixed strategies
measures
