电力市场中激励性发电商竞价机制设计研究

Study on Incentive Bidding Mechanism Design of Generators in Electricity Market

利用机制设计和边际成本定价理论,首次将发电商报价曲线的斜率和截距分别作为策略变量设计了一种具有激励相容特性的发电市场竞价机制并推导了相关公式.模型中发电成本考虑了更为通用的二次函数形式,发电报价按线性函数考虑.仿真结果表明,在所考虑的条件及相应设计的竞价机制下,各发电商均有动力按照真实成本报价,所设计的竞价机制是有效的.

On the basis of mechanism design theory and marginal pricing theory, the slope and intercept of bid curves of generators are used as strategy variance, and a kind of incentive compatible bidding mechanism is designed and relative formulus are derived. In this model, quadratic cost function and line bidding function are used. The test result shows that the generators have motive to bidding true cost under this model, and the mechanism designed is effective.