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基于非对称信息理论的会计问题研究 被引量:1

Research on Accounting Issues Based on Asymmetric Information Theory
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摘要 非对称信息理论是研究信息不对称条件下最优交易合约设计问题的理论,是信息经济学研究的核心,该理论对许多研究领域都有很强的指导作用,具有广泛的应用前景。阐述了非对称信息理论的内容,分析了该理论对盈余管理、内部控制和责任会计等问题研究的影响,可以看出在运用非对称信息理论研究会计问题时,明确地引入了利益矛盾、激励问题和控制机制,因此可以得出很多有现实指导意义的结论。 Asymmetric information theory is such a theory that optimizes the contractual relationships under asymmetric information conditions. It is the core of information economics, which is very instructive to many application fields with good prospects. The asymmetric information theory is thus deliberated to analyze its influences on some accounting issues, such as earning management, internal control and responsibility accounting. It is found that the contradiction between different parties' benefits and ways of incentive and control will be involved in definitely if introducing the asymmetric information theory in accounting issues, thus reaching some practical conclusions to guide further research.
出处 《东北大学学报(社会科学版)》 2004年第5期339-341,共3页 Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)
关键词 非对称信息理论 盈余管理 内部控制 责任会计 asymmetric information theory earning management internal control responsibility accounting
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参考文献10

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