政府官员腐败行为的决定机制——对寻租腐败与代理腐败的数理分析

The Decision Mechanism Leading to the Official Corrupt Behavior——The Mathematical Analysis of Both Agent Corrupt and Finding-Rent Corrupt

政府官员的腐败行为分为代理腐败和寻租腐败两种类型,通过建立博弈模型,可以运用数理模型分析影响两种腐败行为的相关因素。要遏止政府官员的腐败行为,就要提高检查腐败行为的工作质量,加大惩处力度。同时,还应针对不同的腐败行为,实施相应的惩处,使政府机构的腐败行为减少到最低程度。

The official's corrupt behavior can be divided into two types that are agent corrupt behavior and rent-seeking corrupt behavior. This article analyzes the related factors influencing the kinds of corrupt behaviors by establishing the game model. The conclusion is that we can improve the working quality of checking the corrupt behaviors,enforce the punishment for corrupt behavior to hold back officials' corrupt behavior. At the same time,officials' different corrupt behavior should be given corresponding punishment. Only by doing so,can we minimize corrupt behaviors in the government .