变额寿险的博弈分析

The study of games in variable life insurance

建立了一个有关变额寿险的博弈模型,由此发现变额寿险的一些特征,如保险公司的整体收益率不能高于分立账户的收益率、投保人对分立账户盈利能力的看法影响到保险公司的决策、变额寿险实现的是"薄利多销"等;并分析了对变额寿险进行利率和保障比例进行监管所带来的影响.

We establish a dynamic game model for variable insurance, and find some interesting properties about the variable insurance. For example, the expected rate of return of separate account is not lower than the whole rate of return of the insurance company; the opinion of the insurace applicant on the investment ability of the separate account effects the decisions of the insurance company; compared with the fixed insurance, the unit avenue of the variable insurance for the insurance company is decreased, but the whole avenue is increased. We also study the effect of regulation on the interest rate and the ratio of fundamental insurance safeguard.