合同市场中的发电商成本信息甄别

Informational discrimination in suppliers' costs on contract market

电力市场下交易中心无法获知发电商的成本等信息,往往会因为信息不对称而导致逆向选择。针对这一问题,提出了利用信息甄别模型对不同类型发电商的成本信息进行甄别。模型基于交易中心效用最优的前提,通过设计分离均衡式合同来激励不同类型的发电商真实显示自身信息,谎报自身信息的发电商将遭受收益损失。论述了发电商成本信息甄别的机理,提出了用于甄别发电商成本信息的合同设计模型。以模型和算例说明了这种方法可有效甄别成本不同的发电商,从而给予区别对待,使发电商和交易中心的效用同时得到优化。

In electricity market,the suppliers'costs are unknowable to the Trade Center,which often leads to adverse selection. The screening model is used to discriminate the information of suppliers'costs. Based on the precondition of Trade Center's utility optimization,the separate balance contracts are designed to inspirit the suppliers to reveal their own information. Those who give false information will suffer loss of income. The mechanism of informational discrimination on cost of suppliers is discussed and the model of incentive contract design of suppliers'cost is presented. A model and an example are used to illuminate that suppliers with different costs can be discriminated and receive different treatments,and the trade center and the suppliers can achieve the optimal utilities simultaneously. This project is supported by Guangdong Province Natural Science Fund(000397).