电力市场中激励性可中断负荷合同的建模与实施研究

MODELING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INCENTIVE INTERRUPTIBLE LOAD CONTRACTS IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS

考虑到供电公司的风险偏好,作者应用机制设计理论建立了一种用户类型离散的可中断负荷合同模型。分析和算例结果表明,无论供电公司的风险偏好如何,该合同模型均能引导用户披露真实信息,实现电力资源的有效配置,且供电公司能从中节约供电成本。因此,激励性可中断负荷合同不仅能提高用户需求弹性,还有助于供电公司回避市场风险。尤其是对于风险进取的供电公司,可中断负荷合同将成为其进行市场竞争和风险管理的有力工具。因而所提出的模型为供电公司参与市场竞争提供了一种新的思路。

Taking risk preference of distribution companies into account, an incentive interruptible load contract model for discrete customer types is developed by use of mechanism design. The results of analysis and calculation examples show that the proposed model can lead customers to voluntarily reveal their true information and thereby the electric power resources can be efficiently allocated, in the meantime, the distribution companies' benefit from the cost saving of electric power supply can be improved, whatever the risk preference of distribution companies may be. Therefore, incentive interruptible load contracts not only can improve customers' demand elasticity, but also can help distribution companies to avoid market risk. Especially, the proposed model would be a powerful tool for risk-taken distribution companies in the participation of market competition and in the management of the risk. So the proposed model would be offer a new thinking for distribution companies to participate the market competition.