集群内企业创新行为的进化博弈分析

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Corporation's Innovation Behavior in Cluster

文章运用行为生态学的进化博弈理论,对集群内企业技术创新行为构建了鹰—鸽博弈、鹰—鸽—反击者博弈和鹰—鸽—应变者博弈三个进化博弈模型。对这些模型的分析表明,集群内企业创新行为不存在纯策略进化稳定均衡,但存在混合策略进化稳定均衡或"行为策略"进化稳定均衡,这反映了集群内企业创新行为的协同竞争性以及这种协同竞争创新行为的进化稳定性。

By Evolutionary Game theories, this paper analyzes corporation's innovation behavior in cluster, and constructs three Game models: Hawk-Dove Game, Hawk-Dove-Retaliator Game and Hawk-Dove-Asymmetry Game. The results show that there is no pure strategy ESS in these models, but has mixed strategy ESS, which indicate the evolutionary stable character of synergic competition of corporation's innovation behavior.