我国政府采购招标的博弈论模型研究

Game Theoretical Models of Government Procurement Auction in China

本文主要研究关于国际范围内我国政府采购招标投标的博弈论模型,在McAfee & McMillan模型和Naegelen & Mougeout模型的基础上,模拟了我国政府采购的现行政策。同时也论述了中国加入WTO取消关税后,如何制定一个适当的优惠政策和最优招标与拍卖机制,使得政府和国内企业均可获利。

This paper surveys several main models of Government procurement auction including models of McAfee & McMillan and Naegelen & Mougcout. These models are commented briefly in this paper. The current Chinese procurement process is simulated. We also discuss about how to decide a preference and an optimal auction mechanism so that the government and domestic firms are all in win -win situation after China enters WTO.