产权约束、投资低效与通货紧缩

Property Rights, Inefficient Investment and Deflation

本文从产权逻辑来诠释 2 0 0 3年以来的投资膨胀。文章认为 ,在土地转让权含糊不清和银行产权约束不力的背景下 ,土地和信贷市场的价格机制无法给出市场定价 ,客观造成了巨大套利空间的存在。当经济景气时 ,一些地方政府、企业和银行三方共谋土地和贷款这两种最关键的生产要素 ,从而导致投资的非理性膨胀 ,并通过金融加速器效应带来宏观经济的大幅波动。从根源上讲 ,过度投资和投资低效的本质是产权约束和地方政府政绩观导向的问题。因而 ,本文提出的相应政策含义是 ,在短期内主要以经济杠杆来控制总量 ;在中长期应转变政府职能 ,推进产权改革。

This paper develops a property rights framework for the analysis of inefficient investment expansion in China. It argues that the ambiguity of land transfer rights and incompleteness of banks' property rights have profound impact on the behavior of investment. Pursuing their political promotion, local government officials have incentive to encourage investment by transferring land to firms at the cost lower than market price. Because of the incompleteness of property rights constraint, the banks also intend to provide finance support for such investment without paying enough attention to the possibility of NPLs. These factors considerably lower the private investment cost for rational investors without accounting for the high social costs, which result in an over expansion of investment. Consequently, over investments lead to over capacity, which lead to deflation.