摘要
在不对称信息的金融市场模型里,价格反映了交易者持有的私有信息,知情交易者为了获取高额收益会操纵市场价格信息。本文通过连续交易制度下的竞价模型证明了只要在私人信息披露之前交易的周期数足够大,则均衡一定存在,且只存在全部知情交易者都执行操纵策略的均衡,即在有知情交易者执行非操纵策略时不存在均衡。
In asymmetric information models of financial markets,prices reveal private information held by traders.The insiders will manipulate the information of the market prices for private profit.We show that when the number of periods of trading is large enough,every equibibrium involves manipulation by every type of the informed trader.There does not exist an equilibrium where either type of the informed trader trades non-manipulatively.
出处
《山东科学》
CAS
2004年第3期5-9,共5页
Shandong Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70273027)
关键词
知情者
操纵
策略
均衡
informed trader
manipulation
strategy
equilibrium
