摘要
具有产品差异的两企业,在仅进行一轮的产品定价策略博弈中,先后次序的施塔贝格竞争均衡与纳什均衡的结果是企业双方都具有较高的均衡价格和正的均衡利润。在伯川德-施塔贝格市场竞争均衡下,追随企业具有后发制人的优势,能获得比领先企业更高的利润,并且两企业的利润都高于伯川德-纳什均衡利润。但在多轮博弈的模型中伯川德-施塔贝格均衡点并不稳定,最终会趋向于伯川德-纳什均衡点。
In the only round of product pricing strategic game between two enterprises with product differentiation, the results of Stackelber competition equilibrium of the priority and Nash equilibrium have higher equilibrium price and positive equilibrium profit. In the Bertrand-Stackelberg market competition equilibrium, the follower Enterprise 2 has the advantage of surpassing the former and can make more profit than the leader Enterprise 1. The profits of two enterprises are higher than Bertrand-Nash equilibrium profit. The Bertrand-Stackelberg equilibrium profit, which is not stable in the multi-round model, will eventually come close to Bertrand-Nash equilibrium profit.
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
2004年第5期26-30,共5页
Journal of Management Science
基金
辽宁省自然科学基金资助项目(98102005)
关键词
寡头垄断
产品差异
博弈构式
纳什均衡
施塔贝格均衡
Oligopoly
Product differentiation
Game structure
Nash equilibrium
Stackelber equilibrium