参与型可转换优先股与最优风险投资退出决策

Participating preferred convertible equity and optimal exit decisions about venture capital

通过建立退出控制权分配模型探讨了风险投资退出过程中参与型可转换优先股的转换问题,指出风险投资家使用参与型可转换优先股总可以实现Pareto最优退出选择;当事先协议的风险投资家转换后企业家在退出收入流中的份额满足一定条件时,参与型可转换优先股转换成有投票权股份或无投票权股份的决定因素是风险投资家参与企业剩余价值分配的比例和边际声誉所得以及企业家的私人控制利益.

This paper explores the converting issue about participating preferred convertible equity by developing a model of the allocation of the control rights in the process of the exit of venture capital. It shows that with participating preferred convertible equity the Pareto exit solution can always be achieved. When the ante_agreed share of exit cash flow of the entrepreneur after converting meets certain condition, the determinants of Pareto exit solution that the venture capitalists convert their participating preferred convertible equity into voting and nonvoting shares are as follows: the share occupied by the venture capitalists in the residue value of the investee company the marginal reputation return and the private control benefits.