盈利预测误差的契约性与上市公司盈余管理研究

The Contracted Character of Earnings Forecast Deviation and the Research on Earnings Management Behavior of Listed Companies

文章研究上市公司盈利预测误差对公司盈余管理行为的影响。文章从我国证券市场盈利预测契约特征的特殊性出发,分析盈余管理动机与盈利预测误差的关系,对盈利预测负误差幅度在20%以内的公司盈余管理行为进行检验。研究发现:高估盈利但高估程度在20%以内的公司,在上市后的第一年都或多或少地存在通过管理主观利润和营运资金项目以调增盈利的行为。该结果表明上市公司为了避免由于存在盈利预测误差而受到处罚,都存在着盈余管理行为动机。

The paper researches the influence of earnings forecast deviation on earnings management behavior of listed companies. Starting from the contracted character of earnings forecast in our security market, the paper analyzes the relationship between the earnings management motivation and earnings forecast deviation and tests the earnings management behavior of the company with the negative earnings forecast deviation within 20%. The tests on companies which overestimate earnings but with the overestimated degree not more than 20% about their earnings management behavior will somewhat adjust its earnings by managing discretionary accruals and operation capital in the first year after IPO. The results show that in order to avoid punishment because of earnings forecast error, listed companies have motivation of managing profit.