我国商业银行信贷决策动态博弈分析

Dynamic Games Analysis on the Credit Decisionmaking of China's Commercial Banks

本文对我国商业银行的信贷决策过程进行了完全信息和不完全信息条件下的动态博弈分析。完全信息条件下,一次性博弈的均衡结果取决于银行对抵押物进行变现所获收入的大小;无限重复博弈的均衡结果表明,如果银行采取触发战略,只要企业足够关心远期利益,即使不能提供优质抵押品,企业会认真履约,银行也会给予贷款。在不完全信息条件下构造信号博弈进行分析,说明在当前不完善的外部经营环境下,银行信贷决策所期望的分离均衡状态难以达到。

In this paper ,commercial banks' credit decisionmaking process is analyzed using the dynamic games theory under the conditions of complete information and incompletion information.Under the conditions of complete information ,the equilibria of sequential games depends on cashes converted from mortgages by banks.When a type of trigger strategy is adopted by the commercial banks, however ,the equilibria of the infinitely repeated games model shows that the firms caring about the longterm interest will follow the credit contract, and the bank will adopt the firm's request of borrowing even if inadequate cashes can be converted from mortgages provided by the firm.Under the conditions of incompletion information, the analysis is conducted with the help of the signaling games.Deductions show that the imperfectness of the banks' outer running circumstances makes the separating equilibrium expected by commercial banks in their credit decisionmaking process difficult to be realized.