债务融资、经营者自身利益与产品市场寡头竞争

Capital Structure, Agency Problem and Competition in Oligopoly

Brander和Lewis发现,在寡头垄断的市场结构中,增加债务融资可以使该企业在产品市场竞争中变得更激进。本文通过引入经营者在产品市场竞争中自身利益这一新变量,发现股东有限责任效应导致的经营者扩大产量水平的动机与经营者权利责任关系不对称程度,与责任大于权利方向加深而导致降低产量的倾向之间存在一个权衡。随着单方面债务水平的提高,在某些条件下该企业变得更激进,而在另一些条件下该企业反而有可能变得为更消极。

James and Lewis argue that limited liability may commit a leveraged firm to a more aggressive output stance, assuming that there is no agency problems between equity holders and managers. In fact, debt levels influence the benefit of managers concerning the tradeoff between earnings and obligation in product market competition, which incentive them to take more or less aggressive output strategy in oligopoly. The author considers this kind of effect on output should be tradeoff between the kind effects of limited liability, which make the output strategy ambiguous.