摘要
本文以文献[1]和文献[2]为基础,将税收检查成本及偷税成本量化后,对防止偷骗税行为进行非零和博弈分析。具体指出罚款系数的确定方法,为税务决策部门针对偷骗税行为制定合理的罚款系数提供了可操作的理论依据。
This paper analyzes non-zero-sum game for preventing tax evasion after the quantitative analysis of the checking cost of taxation bureau and the evading taxes cost of taxpayers on the basis of paper[1] and paper[2]. It gives a definite method of penalty coefficient and contributes workable theoretical grounds to the policy decision departments for defining reasonable penalty coefficient preventing tax evasion.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2004年第5期81-85,共5页
Operations Research and Management Science
关键词
运筹学
罚款系数
非零和博弈
双矩阵对策
平衡点
检查成本
期望损失
operations research
penalty coefficient
non-zero-sum game
bi-matrix game
equilibrium point
check cost
expected loss