确定监督费率上界下监督行为博弈分析与激励对策

Game Analysis of Supervision Action and Incentive Tactics under Fixed Supervision Expense Top Line

我国建设工程质量政府监督管理行业特征和市场环境形成了政府质量监督效率不高的现状 ,其中监督费率政策直接影响监督机构工作积极性和政府质量监督管理的有效性。固定监督费率是我国监督取费一直沿用的政策 ,是计划经济条件下的产物 ,不利于调动监督机构从事监督工作的积极性。质量监督市场是有限竞争市场 ,通过分析政府部门与监督机构之间委托代理关系 ,揭示了引进竞争机制 ,确定监督费用上限 ,有利于提高监督效益 。

There are many problems because of industry traits and market environment in quality supervision and management on construction engineering in China. It is obvious for supervision cost policy to influence work enthusiasm and government supervision's effectiveness. Fixed supervision cost in china is the policy formed and used under planned economy system. It cannot bring positive factors of supervision organization into play. Because supervision market is a limited competitive one, we can announce that using competitive mechanism under fixed supervision cost top line can enhance supervision efficiency and reduce morals risk of supervision organization by analyzing principle-agent action between government department and supervision organization.