供应链信息共享激励监督机制研究

STUDY ON THE INFORMATION SHARING INCENTIVE AND SUPERVISORY MECHANISM IN SUPPLY CHAIN

本文首先阐述了供应链企业间委托代理关系的“道德风险”问题的一般解决方法。围绕供应链中的信息共享问题 ,利用委托代理理论 ,在核心企业和成员企业之间设置了一类用来激励成员企业提高信息共享努力水平的激励监督机制 ,并讨论了信息对称和非对称两种情况下的机制特征和保证机制有效的参数条件。在所设计的激励监督机制中 ,首先用对数函数关系描述努力水平和产出的关系 ,突破了传统研究中的线性函数关系的局限性。

In this paper, the normal method to solve the “moral hazard' problem in Supply Chain is firstly presented Then, Aimed at the information sharing problems in Supply Chain, and based on the theory of agency by agreement the incentive and supervisory mechanism is designed to boost partner enterprise's effort level, between core enterprise and partner enterprise. The mechanism's characters and the parameters' terms to ensure the validity are discussed also. In the designed mechanism, the logarithmic function is firstly induced to describe the relationship between effort level and output,which break doun the traditional linear function's limitation.