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风险资本家与风险企业家之间的关系分析

An Analysis of the Relationship between Venture Capitalist and Entrepreneur
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摘要 分析风险资本家与风险企业家之间的关系对于风险企业的治理结构安排与有效运作具有重要意义。本文从委托代理理论与团队生产理论的角度分析了他们之间的关系以及这种理论在风险企业治理中的局限性。我们认为风险投资中风险资本家与风险企业家的关系既不是典型的代理关系,也不是典型的团队关系,而是一种兼而有之的“杂合关系”。这种关系下的风险企业治理既要考虑制度性安排还要建立有效的合作机制。 The analysis of the relationship between venture capitalist and entrepreneur is of crucial significance to the governance of venture business. Based on this analysis and its limitations in application, we argue that their relationship is not a pure agency relationship and a team production, but is more like a ' combinant' relationship.Under this relationship institutional and co- operative aspects are equally important, thus 'flexible governance' should be adopted in the governance of hi- tech start- up firms.
作者 姚佐文
出处 《安徽农业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2003年第3期18-21,共4页 Journal of Anhui Agricultural University:SOC.SCI.
关键词 风险资本家 风险企业家 治理结构 委托代理 团队生产 风险投资 杂合关系 venture capital principal- agent team production corporation governance
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