地方银行机构的可持续竞争力问题研究——从地方政府的效用函数变迁谈起

On the Sustainable Competitiveness of Non-State-Owned Banks——From the Change of U-function of Local Government

地方政府利益推动了非国有商业银行的构建和扩展 ,从而促进了中国银行业市场结构的合理化。但是地方政府干预下的非国有银行机构的不良资产率飙升 ,意味着地方政府对非国有银行的控制成本上升 ,当控制成本大于控制收益时 ,地方政府必然要从地方性银行机构退出。退出的结果可能会降低非国有商业银行的竞争能力。因此 ,竞争力维持与提升问题已成为非国有银行亟待研究的课题。

It is the pursuit of interest of local governments that drives the construction and enlargement of the non-state-owned banking institutions. It promotes the rationalization evolvement of market structure of banking industry in China. However, it is the quick rise of bad loan ratio in the non-state-owned banks that increases the control cost of the non-state-owned banks. When control right of the non-state-owned banks is not worth the candle, local government cannot but exit from the local banking institutions. This will weaken the competitiveness of the non-state-owned banks originally propped by the local government. Hence, how to maintain and promote the competitive power of the non-state-owned bank will be the exigent problem.