人口流动性、公共收入与支出——户籍制度变迁动因分析

Population Mobility, Public Revenue and Expenditure——Analysis of the Evolution of Huji System

本文分析了人口流动性的内生决定 ,以此解释中国户籍管理政策变迁的动因。文章表明 ,分权框架下的区际竞争将推动政府降低人口流动成本。一般而言 ,集权 ①框架下的最优流动性水平普遍低于分权框架下的流动性水平。与我国近 2 0年来户籍政策变化相一致的是 ,跨区劳动力配置需求的上升增加了户籍管制的效率损失成本 ,将推动人口流动成本下降。我们认为 ,除了协调地方公共品供给外部性、限制地区间税收竞争以最大化税收收入这两个基本原因之外 ,我国户籍管制的另一个特殊原因是便于执行地区差别政策。而设置流动成本的效率性取决于政府目标与社会福利最大化的一致性程度。

This paper explores the endogenous determination of population mobility and the evolution of registered household system. It shows that, Fiscal competition among regional government will drive the mobility cost down, generally, the level of mobility under centralized system is lower than that under decentralized system. The increase of demand for inter-regional reallocation of labor would increase the efficiency loss of mobility restriction, which will result in decrease of mobility cost. This paper shows that, there are three basic motivation drive government to restrict migration: (1) eliminating the externality of local public good caused by migration; (2) maximizing government revenue by controlling inter-regional tax competition; and (3) implementing region-differential policies. The efficiency of restriction determined by the consistency of the governments object with social welfare maximization.