摘要
本文是对中国年轻的专利制度的经济学分析。通过一个包含假冒生产行为的理论模型和相应的计量检验 ,我们研究了中国普遍存在的假冒生产活动对专利保护的影响 ,并得出结论 :中国 1 993年以延长专利保护时间为主的专利法修改未使地区专利申请和研究开发投入的倾向上升 ,反而有所下降 ,原因在于专利保护时间的延长刺激了更多的假冒企业进入那些具有较大假冒潜力的行业 ,从而专利开发企业的利益受到了损害 ,也就没有动力进行进一步的研究开发和专利申请。对一切行业实行相同的专利保护期T与相同的惩罚假冒力度K ,必定违反最优专利制度设计原则。应该针对不同行业的假冒生产特点 ,通过制定相应的法律政策使假冒潜力最大的行业假冒成本提高。另外 ,就当前关于计算机软件保护的争论 ,本文认为软件行业过去保护不足。
We analyze the influence of the rampant piracy activities in China on the efficiency of patent protection. We conclude that although patent protection was prolonged since 1993, the incentive to input resources to R&D and apply a patent in China didn't increase but decrease, it is because increasing the length of patent protection gives the imitator a greater incentive to pirate the patent, the patentee then will be harmed more. With both patent length and breadth as instruments, the optimal patent policy consists of imposing more piracy cost on those industries with high piracy potential and vice versa by constructing kinds of statutes and regulations. We also comment on the issue about the protection of software protection in China and hold the opinion that it is necessary to provide additional protection for this industry.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第10期104-114,共11页
Economic Research Journal