摘要
将离婚的可能性引入家庭决策是家庭经济学中新的研究方向。本文构造了一个考虑离婚的两期动态家庭分工模型,在这个模型中,由于存在离婚的可能性,市场工资较低的一方将增加其劳动供给作为一种自我保险,以便更多地获得市场劳动中的人力资本积累,降低在离婚发生时的经济损失。对离婚可能性的考虑导致了动态决策中家庭分工的低效率。而针对家庭稳定性的保险机制则被证明可以纠正这种效率的扭曲。
This paper develops a two-period dynamic model of intra-household labor division with divorce explicitly incorporated. With the possibility of divorce, the member with lower market wage will increase his/her labor supply as a self-insurance in order to accumulate more experience in market work so his/her economic losses are minimized when divorce happens. The possibility of divorce in dynamic decision results in efficiency losses in intra-household labor division. We develop an insurance mechanism that is proved to be able to eliminate this distortion in efficiency.
出处
《经济学(季刊)》
2004年第B10期167-190,共24页
China Economic Quarterly
基金
复旦大学文科科研基金
复旦大学唐仲英科技创新基金的资助