摘要
项目经理的投机行为可以通过监督或激励来缓解。本文建立了有关项目管理中的国有企业监督与项目经理行为之间的模型,并运用此模型分析了项目经理的激励机制、项目经理的行为和企业监督之间的关系,并为如何有效地避免项目经理的投机行为,改进当前激励报酬形式提供了一种分析工具。
Project manager's speculation behaviors can be relieved by monitoring or incentives.This paper sets up a principal-agent model between a firm and its project manager using game theory.The model is used to analyze managerial speculation behaviors and the relationship between managerial behaviors and firms'monitoring.The concept of firm's comprehensive monitoring-punishment degree and its critical quantity are put forward.Sug-gestions are given on how to prevent project managers from speculating.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
2004年第5期120-123,共4页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
河北省哲学社会科学基金项目(200302009)
关键词
博弈论
项目经理行为
监督
激励
game theory
project manager
monitoring
incentive compensation
