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大股东控制和控制权私人利益研究 被引量:73

Study on the Control of Large Shareholder and the Private Benefits of the Control
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摘要 本文用控股股权和非控股股权转让的溢价差来估计我国控制权的私人利益,发现我国的控制权私人利益约为17%,负债率和转让比例对于控股股权转让溢价和非控股股权转让溢价有不同的影响,公司规模和股权转让溢价存在负相关关系。进一步分析发现,控股股东的控制力、股权离散度和控股股权转让溢价存在正相关关系,同时股权制衡度越低,控股股权转让溢价越高。没有发现高管持股比例对控股股权转让溢价存在影响的证据。 This paper measures the value of private benefits of control by the premium difference of the transference of controlling block to non-controlling block. The private benefit of control is 17%. The debt and the share proportion of the transference have different influences over the premium of transference of controlling block and non-controlling block. The size of company has a negative relation with the premium of the transference of block. Further study shows that the controlling power of the shareholder and the decentralization of share have positive relation with the premium of transference of the controlling block. The lower balances power of the shareholder, the higher the premium of the transference of control. No evidence shows that the proportion of highly executive share holding can have influence over the premium of the transference of control.
作者 邓建平 曾勇
出处 《中国软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2004年第10期50-58,共9页 China Soft Science
基金 教育部优秀青年教师资助计划资助(教人司[2003]355号)
关键词 大股东 控制权私人利益 股权结构 溢价 large shareholder the private benefits of control ownership structure premium
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参考文献35

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二级参考文献42

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