摘要
由于输配电领域属于垄断经营,具有操纵电价的市场力,应对其进行严格的价格管制。然而管制者在监管时面对着双重的信息不对称,一方面是理性的垄断企业不会主动揭示自己的真实成本,通过虚报成本来影响管制者决策以便提高电价,另一方面管制者不能有效甄别地消费者类型,这种信息不对称会困扰管制者的决策。该文从激励性机制设计的角度出发,建立了旨在暴露企业的真实成本和有效甄别不同消费者类型的模型,并得出了一些有意义的结论。
It is necessary for the over price sectors of power transmission and distribution to be regulated by the government due to the quality of natural monopoly, which have market power to control price. However, the regulator is always faced with doubly asymmetric information, in other words, regulator has incomplete information about a monopolist’s cost, while can’t identify consumer types. Throughout incentive mechanism design, this paper set up model that can reveal enterprise’s authentic cost successfully and make out consumer types effectively and it also gives some significant conclusions.
出处
《中国电机工程学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2004年第10期40-44,共5页
Proceedings of the CSEE
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(60274048)
湖北省自然科学基金项目(2001ABB047)~~
关键词
管制
输配电企业
真实成本
电价
定价
信息不对称
甄别
模型
用户
揭示
Electris power engineering
Power market
Doubly asymmetric information
Incentive mechanism design
Transmission service
Price regulation
