摘要
委托代理理论认为代理人的报酬是其绩效的函数。依据代理理论和契约理论,公司制企业应以明确的代理契约来定义代理人的绩效与报酬之间的对称关系,绩效评价是支付报酬的标准;因此,契约中除了应有明确的激励约束机制,还应包括科学有效的业绩评价机制,这样才能有效激励经营者朝着委托人的利益目标方向努力工作。只有给予经营者足够的剩余索取权才能从根本上调和经营者与股东之间的利益冲突,以控制代理问题。根据代理理论的要求,在借鉴西方先进做法的基础上结合我国国情,考虑代理人所在企业的特点,我们对代理契约模型的核心内容———业绩考核、报酬支付方式、支付时间等,进行了总体设计。
The entrusting-deputizing theory thinks that the pay of the deputy is the function of his performance. In line with deputy and contract theories, a company should define the relation between the deputy and his performance by defining the deputizing contract because performance is the standard of pay. The contract should include a scientific performance evaluation mechanism as well as a definite stimulating and restricting mechanism so that it can stir the deputy to work hard for the client to realize the targeted interest. Only by granting the manager enough residual rights can the conflict of interest between the manager and the shareholders be solved completely. Therefore, we design the core elements of the mode of the deputizing contract — performance evaluation, way of payment, time of payment in line with western practice as well as the unique Chinese conditions and the features of deputized companies, according to deputizing theories.
出处
《江苏大学学报(社会科学版)》
2004年第6期81-84,共4页
Journal of Jiangsu University(Social Science Edition)
基金
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究项目(03SJD630024)
江苏大学人文社科青年基金项目(JDR2002003)
关键词
代理
契约
激励
绩效
deputizing
contract
stimulation
performance