药品集中招标采购中回扣现象博弈分析

Game Analysis on the Phenomenon of Sales Brokerage in Centralized Drug Purchase by Invitation to Bid

我国从1999年实行药品集中招标采购制度,在规范医药流通领域等方面取得一定成效,但是药品集中招标采购制度仍然不能抑制回扣现象,导致药品集中招标采购方式往往失效。本文从药品价格指数下降而药品费用支出上升的现象引出回扣对集中招标采购的巨大影响,然后从工资博弈模型和纳什均衡模型分析集中招标采购各主体对待回扣的利益关系,最后基于分析结果对药品集中招标采购制度给出若干建议。

Certain achievements have been made in the standardization and the others of drug and hospital equipment markets since carried out was the system of centralized drug purchase by invitation to bid in 1999 in China. This system, however, can not yet curtail sales brokerage, which results in the invalidity of the system. This paper draws the discussion of the strong impact of sales brokerage on the system from the fact of drug price index going down and drug expense up. Then, with the salary game model and Nash equilibrium model it analyzes the correlation among the stakeholders of the bidding program to sales brokerage. And, finally, on the basis of the analysis, the paper gives some proposals to the system.