摘要
党的十六大提出的新的国有资产管理体制,其核心是落实国有企业的出资人职责。国有企业的经营管理是以委托代理关系为基础的制度安排。有代理就需要监督。政府作为国有企业出资人的代表,要履行好出资人职责,需要委派财务总监对国有企业的财务活动进行监管。现行的财务总监实践,可分为纯监督型和管理监控型两大类。纯监督型因片面强调独立性而使财务总监难以深入掌握情况,难以实现有效的监督;管理监控型让财务总监进入企业管理层,克服了纯监督型之不足,在管理中监督,通过监督规范管理,实践中发挥了较好的作用。建议按管理监控型模式规范和完善现行的财务总监制度。
The core of new management system of state-owned assets, which was brought forward on the Sixteenth Congress of Chinese Communist Party, lies on the definition of responsibility of state-owned enterprise's (SOE) investor. Management of SOE is a kind of system arrangement based on the principal-agent relationship, for which supervision should be needed. In order to perform the duties of investor perfectly, the government, as the representative of SOE's investors, should accredit chief financial officer (CFO) to supervise the financial activities of SOE. Presently, the practice of CFO could be divided into two types: Pure Supervision and Managerial Supervision. Because of its unilateral emphasis on independence, the former makes it difficult for CFO to grasp the status thoroughly and then conduct effective supervision; while the latter makes it possible for CFO to enter into the management class of enterprise and conduct supervision during management. Overcoming the weakness of Pure Supervision, Managerial Supervision is proved to be more feasible to standardize management by supervision. Thus, it is strongly recommended to standardize and consummate the present system of CFO according to the model of Management Supervision.
出处
《武汉大学学报(人文科学版)》
CSSCI
2004年第6期762-766,共5页
Wuhan University Journal (Humanity Sciences)
关键词
财务总监
国有企业
出资人职责
监督
管理
chief financial officer(CFO)
state-owned enterprise (SOE)
responsibility of investor
supervision
management