摘要
本文构建的模型分析了在不完全信息下公司治理与资本收益的决定。本文的研究表明,由股东拥有企业全部剩余索取权只是分析框架下的一个特例,真正影响各利益相关者对剩余索取权分配比例的内在因素是人力资本和非人力资本的投入水平、承担的风险以及在企业剩余的分配上所享有的谈判力。随着生产力水平的提高,人力资本所有者对企业产出的分享比例不断上升。本文的结论对我国公司治理的改革有积极的启示和参考作用。
This paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive market in which the return on capital is determined with information completely and incompletely available. The results show it is only a special case that shareholders take all firm residuals, and the intrinsic determinants such as corporate governance and its change, scarcity of the capital and risk play an important role in allocating firm residuals to all related stakeholders. It is suggested that competitive markets and perspicuous property right should be attached importance to in improving corporate governance in China.
出处
《管理评论》
2004年第9期35-40,共6页
Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70272012)
