我国上市公司啄食悖论及融资效率分析

Analysis of the Pecking Order Paradox and Financing Efficiency of China' s Listed Companies

我国上市公司的"圈钱"行为已成为社会嘱目的焦点之一,上市热、配股热和增发热已成为我国证券市场中的突出现象。但我国上市公司在通过股权融资后,大部分经营业绩并没有改善,这种强烈的股权融资偏好以及资金配置效率的低下根源于公司的治理效率,因此,应根据我国上市公司股权结构的特殊性对公司治理效率进行分析,以健全我国的证券市场。

The craze to get money by listed companies in China has become the focus attention of the whole society and such phenomenon as the craze to get listed,to offer rationed shares and to increase issues has already become noticeable.However,after raising funds through equity financing,the business performance of most listed companies has not improved and furthermore,the efficiency of equity financing is lower than that of debt financing.The fundamental reason for the strong preference for equity financing and the low efficiency of fund allocation is a company' s governance efficiency.Therefore,analysis of a company' s low governance efficiency shall be made according to the special features of the equity structure in our nation' s listed companies so as to improve China' s security market.