有关范畴本质的认识——从“客观主义”到“经验现实主义”

Reflections on the essence of category-From objectivism to experimental realism

本文讨论了从传统的“客观主义”到当代“经验现实主义”有关范畴本质问题的观点。尽管亚里士多德的“本质特征”的提法站不住脚 ,但维特根斯坦对于范畴成员共同属性的完全否定也并非没有问题。作者指出 ,虽然G .Lakoff的经验现实主义在许多方面是正确的 ,但它最终并没有解决范畴本质的问题 ,即 。

This paper addresses the question of category, especially of the 'essence' of category, which has been a constant topic of discussion by philosophers of different schools, from objectivism to experimental realism. It points out that, while Aristotle's notion of essential properties does not hold, Wittgenstain's denial of common properties of category members is not without problems. It finally argues that G. Lakoff's experimental realism, although offering a promising approach, is still far from the final solution to the problem of the 'essence' of category.