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股利代理理论研究综述 被引量:5

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摘要 围绕企业的派现行为及其对企业价值、股东福利的影响,国外学术界已争论了几十年,“股利之谜”尚未完全破解。1961年,Miller和Modigliani在完全资本市场(perfect capital market)假设、理性行为(rational behavior)假设和充分肯定(perfect certainty)假设这三大假设的基础上,提出了“股利无关论”。通过放松这几个假定,
作者 苏月中
机构地区 上海财经大学
出处 《经济学动态》 CSSCI 北大核心 2004年第10期87-92,共6页 Economic Perspectives
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参考文献20

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同被引文献51

  • 1谢志华.企业收益分配博弈论[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2005,20(1):58-64. 被引量:3
  • 2杨奇原,李礼.我国上市公司股利政策的影响因素研究[J].求索,2006(8):26-28. 被引量:14
  • 3谢志华.分配制度变革是经济制度改革的核心问题[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2007,22(1):1-6. 被引量:10
  • 4邓建平,曾勇,何佳.利益获取:股利共享还是资金独占?[J].经济研究,2007,42(4):112-123. 被引量:75
  • 5Dewenter K, Warther V. Dividends, asymmetric information, and agency conflicts:Evidence from a comparison of the dividend policies of Japanese and U.S. firms[J].The Journal of Finance, 1998, Vol. 53, 879-904.
  • 6Easterbrook, Frank. Two agency cost explanations of dividends[J]. American Economic Review, 1984,74,650-659.
  • 7Healy, Paul, Krishna Palepu. Earnings information conveyed by dividend initiations and omissions[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988,21,149-175.
  • 8Jensen, M. Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance, and takeovers[J]. The American Economic Review, 1986,Vol. 76, Iss. 2, 323-329.
  • 9Jensen, Michael C, William H. Meckling. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3, 305-360.
  • 10La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W Vishny. Agency problems and dividend policies around the world[J]. The Journal of Finance,Cambridge,2000,Vol. 55, Iss. 1, 1-33.

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