期刊文献+

新政治经济学价值及其适用于中国的原因 被引量:1

The Value of New Economy and the Cause of Its Suitability to China
原文传递
导出
摘要 由于排斥政治因素的新古典经济学已无法解释许多经济行为和现象,加上当前世界范围内普遍存在的政府干预经济,新政治经济学成为经济学关于“政治与经济”、“国家(政府)与市场”之间关系研究的新阶段。引入政治因素、制度因素和实证主义构成其基本理论价值。而实践证明,任何一种试图在宏观上对中国经济转型进行经济学解释的分析框架,它要么将政府作为一个不可或缺的考察变量,要么就将政府行为本身作为其分析框架。因此,作为这种研究取向的理论范式,新政治经济学为解释中国经济转型提供了一个有意义的视角。 Since the new classical economy which rejects political factors could no longer explain much economical behaviors and phenomena, and plus there exists universally at present in the world that governments interfere economy, the new political economics has become a new stage of economics in the studies of the relationship between 'politics and economy' and 'state (government) and market. ' The value of its basic theory is constituted by combining political factor, institutional factor and positivism. But the practice proves that any kind of analytical framework trying to explain economically on the macro-perspective the Chinese economical transition is either taking government as a necessary variable for examination, or taking governmental behavior itself as an analytical framework. Therefore, as the theoretical pattern is in such a research dimension, new political economics provides a meaningful point-of-view for explaining the economical transition in China.
作者 戴敏敏
出处 《学术月刊》 CSSCI 北大核心 2004年第10期73-78,共6页 Academic Monthly
关键词 新政治经济学 实证主义 中国 政府职能 市场经济体制 new political economics, economical transition in China
  • 相关文献

参考文献25

  • 1张维迎,栗树和.地区间竞争与中国国有企业的民营化[J].经济研究,1998,33(12):13-22. 被引量:327
  • 2钱颖一.理解现代经济学[J].经济社会体制比较,2002(2):1-12. 被引量:290
  • 3[美]罗·H·奇尔科特.《比较政治学理论》[M].社会科学文献出版社,1998年版.第474页.
  • 4[美]伊·华勒斯坦.《开放社会科学》[M].三联书店和牛津大学出版社,1997年版..
  • 5[英]凯恩斯.《自由放任主义的终结》(中译本.《预言与劝说》)[M].江苏人民出版社,1997年版..
  • 6[美]布坎南.《宪法经济学》,中译本.《公共论丛.市场社会与公共秩序》[M].三联书店,1996年版.第337-338页.
  • 7[美]丹·缪勒.《公共选择理论》[M].中国社会科学出版社,1999年版.第4页.
  • 8[英]戴维·米勒.《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》[M].中国政法大学出版社,1992年版..
  • 9林毅夫.《中国经济的奇迹》[M].上海三联书店,1994年版..
  • 10张军.《“双轨制”经济学,中国的经济改革(1978—1992)》[M].,.第10-11页.

二级参考文献31

  • 1Akerlof, George. "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism." Quarterly Journal of Economics. 84(3), pp. 488-500, August 1970.
  • 2Akerlof, George. "Procrastination and Obedience." American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. Richard T. Ely Lecture. 81(1), pp.1-19, May 1991.
  • 3Arrow, Kenneth, and Frank Hahn. General Competitive Analysis. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1971.
  • 4Black, Duncan. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958.
  • 5Cheung, Steven N.S. The Theory of Share Tenancy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
  • 6Coase, Ronald. "The Problem of Social Cost." Journal of Law and Economics, 3, pp. 1-44, October, 1960.
  • 7Debreu, Gerald. Theory of Value. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972.
  • 8Diamond, Douglas, and Philip Dybvig. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity." Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), pp. 401-419, June 1983.
  • 9Fama, Eugene. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm." Journal of Political Economy,88(2), pp. 288-307, April 1980.
  • 10Grossman, Gene, and Elhanan Helpman. Special Interest Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2001.

共引文献685

同被引文献22

引证文献1

二级引证文献10

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部